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( These notes provide a summary for
students of
the main points raised in a lecture on this topic given in
December 05.)
Wittgenstein was hugely influential –
twice. Firstly, in Tractatus, he encouraged Logical
Positivism, and then later, in Philosophical
Investigations, his whole view of how we use and
understand language changed. Unlike Logical Positivism,
which had a very narrowness view of meaning, his later work
spoke of ‘language games’ and language as a ‘form of life’.
We need to
start with the earlier philosophy:
In Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus (1921), he argued that the function
of language was to picture the world. Therefore every
statement needed to correspond to some information about the
world itself. This was the view taken up by the Logical
Positivists (and made popular by A J Ayer in Language,
Truth and Logic). Their ‘Verification Principle’ argued
that the meaning of a statement was its method of
verification. A statement is thus only meaningful if it
could (at least in theory) be proved true of false by
evidence.
This created particular problems for religious language and
for ethics – because their statements could not always be
related to experienced facts. If a religious person says:
‘I have just witnessed a miracle.’ or ‘I believe in God’ the
truth is not simply established by looking at evidence.
Some reactions to this:
Verification and falsification is about literal
description. This is totally different from myth, or
literature, or poetry. A creation myth, for example, will
try to show the value and purpose in creation, and the place
that humankind has within it. It is NOT science, and should
not follow scientific criteria of truth. It explores deeper
levels of human experience.
Cognitive language conveys factual information.
Non-cognitive language may convey emotion, give an
order, express hopes and fears - but it does not depend on
external facts. Much religious language is non-cognitive.
Religious language is concerned with
myths and symbols. Advertisers are always looking for the
way a product can become a symbol – it says something about
the person who buys it, wears it, drives it. You look at
the TV advert and ask yourself – ‘Is this the sort of person
I want to be?’ You are being fed a ‘myth’ – not in the
sense that it is unreal, but in the sense of a story that is
composed of symbols, that suggest a deeper meaning.
Non-literal meanings are so much more interesting than
literal ones!
Wittgenstein’s new view of language:
‘Don’t think; look!’
If you want to understand something, it is not enough to
understand the meaning of words and the way they logically
fit together. Rather, it is important to look at how those
words are used. Look at what that claim means for people.
Meaning is given by use.
Language is a ‘form of life.’
For example, a builder may call out
‘beam’ of ‘more bricks’ or the like. Someone understands
what is wanted when he or she hears that word. That language
is a kind of activity. You shout ‘bricks’ because you want
some, not to give a description. The same thing happens when
small children learn language – it is an activity, they
learn what to do with words.
In Philosophical Investigations
Wittgenstein says:
‘Philosophy may in no way interfere with
the actual use of language, it can in the end only describe
it.’
‘Philosophy leaves everything as it is.’
The Language Game
Games operate via rules and
structures; without these they make no sense.
Men kicking a ball around on a piece of grass; football. The
rules of football are not found in nature; it is an
artificial construction. With agreement, the rules could be
changed. The scoring of a goal has no absolute or objective
meaning. But football is the focus of real emotions,
rivalries, loyalties. Football may be ‘unreal,’ in the sense
of being an arbitrary construction, but its impact on
people’s lives is real enough. If I do not know the rules of
your game, I do not know whether what you say makes sense.
A language game could be…
All these are ‘forms of life’; they are
activities. The words only make sense when you understand
the nature and purpose of that activity. That is the essence
of Wittgenstein’s ‘form of life’ and ‘language game’ theory.
The rules for the use of language are
neither right nor wrong: they are merely useful for each
particular application. You can’t say that the joke is
‘wrong’ – it’s simply a joke, and it either works or it
doesn’t.
Implication for religious language
As a ‘language game’ religious language
is understood in terms of the part that it plays in people’s
lives, rather than referring to an external reality. The
meaning of religious terms is shown by the way in which they
are used.
The validity of religious language is
therefore given by the community that uses it; you cannot
separate beliefs from the religious community that espouses
them.
Therefore religious language may not be
literally true (does not refer to the external world) but it
is justified by the way it helps us to understand ourselves
and relate to others who use the same game. It expresses
attitudes and personal intuitions about the world and the
place of humankind within it.
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